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56 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
INTRODUCTION
The underrepresentation of African Americans in jury pools and on
juries is a widespread phenomenon.1 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community,2 lower courts rarely
enforce that right.3 In response, some jurisdictions have taken preemptive 
remedial measures to increase jury-pool diversity, but such actions have
been voluntary and limited in their impact.4 Creating representative juries
requires large-scale, transformational reform to standards of juror 
eligibility, fair cross-section jurisprudence, and policies governing juror
summons. Moreover, to be effective, such reforms must account for the
centuries-long history of exclusion of African Americans from juries.
Beginning with the nation’s founding and continuing into the mid-
20th century, the exclusion of African Americans from grand and petit
juries was near absolute.5 It took nearly 200 years after this nation’s
independence, and almost 100 years after the U.S. Supreme Court
prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection,6 for African Americans
1. See Nina W. Chernoff, Black to the Future: The State Action Doctrine
and the White Jury, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 103, 103 (2019) (“There is a significant
amount of evidence, however, that jury pools do not reflect a fair cross-section of 
their communities, in that they underrepresent African-Americans and Latinos.”).
2. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
3. See Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations:
Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be
Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 797 (2011) (“[T]he overwhelming majority
of fair, cross section claims have failed . . . .”); see also DERRICK A. BELL, RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 304 (6th ed. 2008) (describing the Court’s fair
cross-section cases as “so worthwhile in the abstract but which are so woefully
inadequate in practice”).
4. See, e.g., Court to Hear Seven Cases: Racial Issue in Jury Selection, 
ALEXANDRIA DAILY TOWN TALK, Dec. 11, 1965 at 8 (“Rapides Parish to change 
its jury selection procedures, drawing names from utility customer lists rather than
registered voter rolls. The lawyers said the percentage of African Americans on
the lists was not fairly representative of the African American population
percentage in the judicial division.”).
5. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 884 (1994) (“[T]he first African-
Americans ever to serve on a jury in America were two who sat in Worcester,
Massachusetts, in 1860.”).
6. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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572020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
to begin to serve on juries with regularity.7 However, the current race-
neutral policies and practices of summoning people for jury service tend
to mimic the results of explicitly race-based practices from the past.
Although existing scholarship discusses the history of jury service, the
difficulties of litigating fair cross-section claims, and the impact of felony-
conviction disenfranchisement on juror eligibility, few articles address the
intersection of these issues from a racial justice lens and with an eye
toward implementing race-conscious reforms of juror summoning
policies, fair cross-section law, and standards of juror eligibility.
Most importantly, this Article explores the unbroken thread between
the historical exclusion of Black people from juries and contemporary
underrepresentation. Beyond identifying this historical link, the Article 
also recommends policy and legal solutions to increase jury-pool diversity.
Part I will detail this nation’s history of African American exclusion from
jury service, which continued through the middle of the 20th century
despite the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Supreme 
Court’s repeated prohibition on excluding jurors based on race. Part II will
survey statutory and legal attempts to achieve racially representative juries 
through the passage of the Jury Selection and Jury Service Act and through
fair cross-section jurisprudence. Part III will track contemporary policies
that disenfranchise people with certain criminal convictions, resulting in
the exclusion of Black people from juries. Finally, Part IV will recommend
legal and policy solutions that would meaningfully increase the
representation of Black people in jury pools. 
I. AFRICAN AMERICAN EXCLUSION 
The jury is a sacred and defining aspect of the American legal system.8 
In forming the new nation, the constitutional framers envisioned the jury
7. But see Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 897 (lamenting that in 1994,
“the history of efforts to secure an equal place in the jury box for Americans of
African descent is not yet concluded”).
8. See 1 JOHN DICKINSON, The Declaration of Rights adopted by the Stamp
Act Congress, October 19, 1765, in THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON:
POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1764-1774 178, 185 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Phila.,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1895) (“VII. That trials by jury are the inherent
and invaluable right of every British Subject in these Colonies.”); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us in 
many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (“[B]y the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in
criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried
impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.”).
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58 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
as a powerful protection against arbitrary and unjust action.9 From the
beginning, the framers recognized jury service as a marker of citizenship,
akin to voting.10 In refusing to recognize Black people as citizens, the
framers implicitly excluded them from jury service.11 With few
exceptions, Black people did not serve on juries until after the 
Reconstruction Amendments.12 
A. De Jure Exclusion 
Early American standards for jury service varied from state to state.
Every state limited jury service to men,13 and a few states explicitly
conditioned jury service on being white.14 States also patterned the
requirements for jury service on voting, which many states limited to white
9. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. (“The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. . . . Fear of
unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.”); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991)
(“[T]he key role of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against
governmental overreaching.”).
10. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to
Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 217–21 (“First, the Framers recognized the
connection between jury service and other forms of political participation,
especially voting. Second, this connection between jury service and voting as two
components in a package of political rights runs through the reconstruction and
voting discrimination amendments . . . .”).
11. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 423 (1857) (concluding that the
framers did not contemplate including Black people as citizens when drafting the
Constitution).
12. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE 
STATES, 1790-1860 94 (1961) (reporting that the two African Americans who
served on a Massachusetts jury in 1860 were “the first of such instances” in the
state’s history). Although some other Northern states did not explicitly limit jury
service to white men, custom and prejudice prevented Black people in those states 
from serving. See also Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:
Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L. J. 415 (1986).
13. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 877.
14. See LITWACK, supra note 12, at 477 (noting that even when states did not
prohibit Black people from serving on juries, such service was rare).
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592020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
men.15 For instance, South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia limited voting
rights, and thus jury service, to white men.16 The statutory standards in
state courts often defined the standards for the federal courts located in the
those states.17 In Tennessee, for example, the legislature specified: “Every 
white male citizen who is a freeholder, or householder, and twenty-one
years of age, is legally qualified to act as a grand or petit juror . . . .”18 
Therefore, in both Tennessee state and federal courts, only white men
could serve on juries. West Virginia had a similar statute: “All white male
persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State
shall be liable to serve as jurors . . . .”19 
During the brief period of Reconstruction, broad sweeping federal
legislation extended citizenship with all its privileges and immunities to
Black people, enabling them to serve on juries and to exercise the right to
vote.20 New Black civic participation resulted in the election of a wave of
Black lawmakers, particularly in formerly slaveholding states.21 However, 
Black exercise of citizenship was short-lived. The end of de jure exclusion
of African American jurors coincided with a surge in anti-Black
violence.22 Following its formation in 1865,23 the Ku Klux Klan and other
15. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 9, 1831, §1, 29 Ohio Laws 94, 94 (1831) (tying jury
service to the right to vote).
16. See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO
DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 15 (1960).
17. Honorable Arthur J. Stanley, Jr., Federal Jury Selection and Service 
Before and After 1968, 66 F.R.D. 375, 375 (1975).
18. See TENN. CODE § 4002 (1858) (emphasis added).
19. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
20. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (1987)) (providing African Americans with
equal rights under the law); Civil Rights Act of 1875, Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2015)) (forbidding disqualification from
jury service on the basis of race and criminalizing racial discrimination in jury
selection at the hands of state and federal officials); see also Alschuler & Deiss,
supra note 5, at 867 (“During Reconstruction, African-Americans in some 
jurisdictions regularly served on juries.”). But see id. at 868 (“Some Southern 
jurisdictions, however, kept African-Americans from jury service even during
Reconstruction.”).
21. See generally PHILIP DRAY, CAPITAL MEN: THE EPIC STORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE LIVES OF THE FIRST BLACK CONGRESSMEN
(2010).
22. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 179 (1985).
23. See ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX KLAN 
CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION 3–5 (1971).
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60 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
white supremacists waged a campaign of intimidation to ensure that Black
citizens did not exercise their newly granted rights, including that of jury
service.24 Across the fractured nation, angry white mobs, in some cases
backed by white government officials, attacked Black people and targeted
Black churches, schools, and communities with violence and destruction.25 
Further, local white officials used their authority to minimize and in many
instances block Black political gains.26 The wave of violence and
intimidation had the intended result: Black people stayed away from the
24. See generally PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE 
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 109–13 (2002) (detailing Southern white
resistance to recognizing Black rights, including voter fraud, physical violence,
and instituting poll taxes and literacy tests).
25. See, e.g., JAMES G. HOLLANDSWORTH JR., AN ABSOLUTE MASSACRE:
THE NEW ORLEANS RACE RIOT OF JULY 30, 1866 3, 12, 104–05 (2001)
(describing the New Orleans massacre of 1866 in which over 200 Black Union
war veterans were killed, including 40 delegates at the Constitutional Convention;
in response, Mayor Monroe and other city officials were removed from office for
their role in the massacre); Calvin Schermerhorn, Civil-Rights Laws Don’t Always 
Stop Racism, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/05/the-memphis-massacre-of-1866-and-black-voter-suppression-to
day/481737/ [https://perma.cc/A83Z-R74K] (detailing widespread violence in
Memphis, led by local white officials and directed at Black residents and
neighborhoods: “The [1866] Memphis Massacre shows that deadly violence and
denials of citizens’ rights can happen even when civil-rights laws are in place,
particularly when those laws are defanged or unenforced”); Melinda M.
Hennessey, Political Terrorism in the Black Belt: The Eutaw Riot, 33 ALA. REV.
35, 35–48 (1980) (describing events on October 25, 1870, when Klansmen
attacked the crowd at a Republican rally with over 2,000 Black attendees in
Eutaw, Greene County, Alabama); The Riot of 1871, MERIDIAN STAR (July 22,
2006) (describing anti-Black violence in Meridian, Mississippi in March 1871,
resulting in the death of 30 Black people and the mayor being driven out of office); 
Mark M. Smith, “All is Not Quiet in Our Hellish County”: Facts, Fiction,
Politics, and Race: The Ellenton Riot of 1876, 95 S.C. HIST. MAG. 142 (Apr.
1994); Melinda M. Hennessey, Racial Violence during Reconstruction: The 1876
Riots in Charleston and Cainhoy, 86 S.C. HIST. MAG. 100 (Apr. 1985) (detailing
a series of civil unrest and anti-Black violence in South Carolina in 1876,
specifically, Hamburg, Charleston, Ellenton, Cainhoy, Edgefield, Mt. Pleasant, 
and Beaufort).
26. Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights
Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2126 (1996)
(“During the years of presidential Reconstruction, as southern legislatures enacted
the black codes and as white sheriffs, judges, and justices of the peace used their
authority to minimize the effects of emancipation, blacks learned that state and
local officials offered them only a charade of justice.”).
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 27. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment 
as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 78–79 (1990). 
 28. See, e.g., DRAY, supra note 24, at 117–19 (describing limitations of state 
and federal government to indict and try individuals responsible for lynching Lake 
City, South Carolina’s first Black Postmaster Frazier Baker, his wife, and infant 
child, “because any such jury would most likely be composed of some of the 
members of the lynch mob itself”).  
 29. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 30. Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death Penalty, 
51.3 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 985, 1003 (2020). 
 31. See Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, at the First Session, 
39th Cong., Part III, 37 (Jan. 30, 1866) (responding to whether an aggrieved Black 
man would turn to the courts, Major General Clinton Fisk explained, “[T]he 
negro . . . would not dream of such a thing [because of] . . . fear of personal 
violence to himself, and because he would think it would be utterly futile . . . .”). 
 32. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS – THE COLONIAL PERIOD 58 (1978); see also GEORGE 
MCDOWELL STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE 
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 44, 194 (1856) (explaining 
that an enslaved person could not testify against a white person, but could testify 
against another enslaved person). 
 33. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
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polls and disengaged from civic life, including from jury service.27 The 
absence of Black people on juries meant that in the rare occurrence that
the state filed criminal charges against anyone engaging in such violence,
an all-white jury would acquit them.28 
Amidst the violent resistance to Reconstruction, the U.S. Supreme
Court had the opportunity to decide whether the recently enacted
Fourteenth Amendment prevented a state from discriminating on the basis
of race during jury selection.29 When drafting the Fourteenth Amendment,
“[f]orefront in the framers’ minds was to provide redress to Black victims
of crimes.”30 Prior to drafting the Amendment, members of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction heard testimony from lawyers, military 
leaders, and businessmen in the South who reported that Black victims of
crime had little hope of redress in the courts,31 in part because in most
states they could neither testify against white people nor serve on juries.32 
Accordingly, the Court’s principal concern was protecting the rights of
Black defendants, not the rights of Black prospective jurors. 
After an all-white jury in West Virginia convicted and sentenced
Taylor Strauder, a formerly enslaved person, to death, Strauder appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.33 The question before the Court was whether
West Virginia’s laws limiting jury service to white men violated the
348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd  66 12/2/20  7:03 AM









     
      
    
      
  




   
  
    
  
   
 
   




    
     
 
  
        
  
      
       
      
 
 
   
 
    
 
    
  
62 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Fourteenth Amendment.34 Answering in the affirmative, the Court
explained that the framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
African Americans, newly freed from enslavement, from unfriendly state 
action.35 Thus, the Court held unconstitutional West Virginia’s statute 
preventing African Americans from serving on juries.36 The prohibition
violated the rights of Black defendants to equal protection of the laws,
which included a trial by jury and a judgment by one’s peers.37 Ultimately,
the decision proved aspirational at best, as it did little to protect against the
subsequent de facto exclusion of Black people from juries.38 
B. De Facto Exclusion 
Although juror-qualification laws after Strauder could no longer
specify the race of prospective jurors, the revamped laws provided jury
commissioners and clerks with broad discretion in selecting jurors with
certain desired attributes. Across the country, states established vague
standards of juror eligibility—honest and intelligent men, those of good
moral character, and those who have not been convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude—that effectively excluded Black people from
juries.39 Although these laws did not explicitly mention race, the resulting 
all-white grand and petit juries from jurisdictions with substantial Black
34. Id.
35. Id. at 310 (“[The Fourteenth Amendment’s] aim was against 
discrimination because of race or color. As we have said more than once, its
design was to protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal 
discriminations against those who belong to it.”).
36. Id.
37. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 900 (Feb. 8, 1872) (Senator George
Edmunds, Vermont: “Where would be the value of declaring that a colored man
should have equal rights of trial by jury and equal rights of judgement by his peers,
if you are to say that the jurors are to be composed of the Ku Klux Klan . . . ? You
are to put him in the hands of his enemies for trial.”).
38. See discussion infra Part I.B.
39. See South Slow to Revamp Juries, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 19, 1935, at
2 (Alabama: A jury commissioner determines the mental, physical and moral
fitness of a juror; Georgia: The jury commissioners must select from the books of
the tax receiver the most upright and intelligent men in the community; Louisiana:
Must be qualified electors, citizens of the state between 21 and 60, and must be
able to read and write and understand the constitution; North Carolina: Must be a
property owner and all taxes of previous year must be paid and of good moral
character; South Carolina: Each juror must be a qualified elector between the ages
of 21 and 65, of good moral character. A qualified elector must be registered for
general elections).
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632020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
populations indicated race-based exclusion. Legal challenges to all-white 
juries in criminal trials proved futile given the high standard of proof
required to show intentional discrimination based on race.40 
What started as de jure exclusion based on race morphed into de facto
exclusion with the same result. For example, Tennessee’s jury service 
statute enabled court officials to subjectively assess the qualifications of
jurors—beyond age and head-of-household status. Specifically, officials
were to find “such persons . . . esteemed in their community for their
integrity, fair character and sound judgment.”41 Following Strauder, a 
criminal defendant challenged a similarly worded law in Alabama,
pointing out that Macon County, where an all-white grand jury indicted
the defendant, was over 70% Black.42 However, the state’s high court
demurred, holding that it was powerless to intervene when legislative
authority enabled state officials to exercise discretion when empaneling
juries. Rather, the court shifted responsibility to Alabama’s voters: “If 
there was abuse, it would seem the redress was intended to be left to the
removal of the faithless officers, or in legislative change.”43 However,
except for the brief period of Reconstruction, Alabama’s voters looked like 
Alabama’s jury pools: all-white.44 
De facto exclusion of Black people from juries continued well into the
20th century, even after the Court’s 1935 decision prohibited the
practice.45 The decision resulted from Alabama’s prosecution of nine 
Black teenagers, known as the Scottsboro Boys, whom a pair of white
women falsely accused of rape.46 The State convened all-white juries and
swiftly convicted the nine, securing death sentences against all but the
youngest.47 In one of three decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court
40. See, e.g., Eastling v. Arkansas, 62 S.W. 584 (Ark. 1901); Wilson v.
Georgia, 69 Ga. 224 (1882); Smith v. Kentucky, 33 S.W. 825 (Ky. 1896); Louisiana
v. Murray, 17 So. 832 (La. 1895); Cooper v. Maryland, 20 A. 986 (Md. 1885);
Missouri v. Brown, 24 S.W. 1027 (Mo. 1894); Bullock v. New Jersey, 47 A. 62
(N.J. 1900); North Carolina v. Sloan, 2 S.E. 666 (N.C. 1887); South Carolina v.
Brownfield, 39 S.E. 2 (S.C. 1901); Martin v. Texas, 72 S.W. 386 (Tex. 1903).
41. Part III, Title 4, Ch. 5, Art. 1, § 4765 (1884).
42. Green v. State, 73 Ala. 26, 30 (1882).
43. Id. at 41–42.
44. See ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 166–67 (2019) (citing Giles v.
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked authority
to order Alabama to allow Black people to register to vote)).
45. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
46. Id. at 588.
47. Id.; see also Alan Binder, Alabama Pardons 3 ‘Scottsboro Boys’ After 80
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A14.
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64 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
resulting from the incident,48 Norris v. Alabama, the Court reviewed
testimony about the state’s laws on juror qualification.49 In accordance
with Strauder, Alabama had long ago passed juror qualification laws
identifying desired characteristics for juries, none of which mentioned
race.50 However, as with similarly worded laws passed throughout the
South, Alabama’s law allowed local officials to exercise discretion when
empaneling jurors.51 In explaining the absence of Black people on the
grand jury in Norris, the jury commissioner testified:
I do not know of any negro in Morgan County . . . who is
generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and who is esteemed
in the community for his integrity, good character and sound
judgment, who is not an habitual drunkard, who isn’t afflicted
with a permanent disease or physical weakness . . . and who can
read English, and who has never been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude.52 
The Court disagreed, holding that the “long-continued, unvarying, and
wholesale exclusion” of African Americans from juries violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.53 Despite the Court’s strong language in Norris, 
48. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (extending Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (finding denial of due
process where state excluded Black people from defendant’s jury pool).
49. Norris, 294 U.S. at 590–96.
50. See id. at 590–91 (“The jury commission shall place on the jury roll and
in the jury box the names of all male citizens of the county who are generally
reputed to be honest and intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for
their integrity, good character and sound judgment, but no person must be selected
who is under twenty-one or over sixty-five years of age, or, who is an habitual 
drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness
is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror, or who cannot read English, or who has
ever been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot
read English and has all the other qualifications prescribed herein and is a 
freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on the jury roll and in the jury
box.”) (quoting ALA. CODE § 8603 (1923)).
51. South Slow to Revamp Juries, supra note 39. (“There are no laws barring
the Negro, as such, from jury service in Dixie, a survey showed. Negroes have
served in some instances on Southern juries, but actually few have been given this
right since [R]econstruction days. The Negro does not serve in juries, principally
because, like many whites, in most instances he is unable to fill the qualifications
of citizenship demanded for jury service, it was found.”).
52. Norris, 294 U.S. at 598–99.
53. Id. at 597.
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652020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
states were slow to allow Black people to serve on juries. For instance,
Tennessee did not empanel a Black juror in Nashville until 1949,54 and it
took another 15 years for counties across the state to empanel Black jurors, 
who usually served only one at a time.55 
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court again weighed in on a claim of racial
discrimination in jury selection in Swain v. Alabama.56 Swain, who had
been sentenced to death for rape, challenged both the total exclusion of
African Americans from his petit jury and the systemic
underrepresentation of Black people on grand juries in the jurisdiction in
which he was tried.57 In responding to the first challenge, the Court held
that the systematic exclusion of Black people based on their race via
peremptory strikes, which allowed counsel to remove a juror for any non-
discriminatory reason, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
Nonetheless, the Court failed to find that the prosecutor in Swain’s case
relied on race in removing all the eligible Black jurors.59 As for the second
question, the Court declined to recognize a defendant’s right to a
proportional number of jurors of his same race.60 The concept of a
54. See Negro to Serve as Petit Juror, NASHVILLE BANNER, Nov. 7, 1949, at
22 (“For the first time in Davison County a young Negro today sat in the Criminal 
Court jury assembly room and will serve as a petit juror . . . .”).
55. See 4 Women Decline Jury Service, NASHVILLE BANNER, July 24, 1951,
at 6 (“First Negro juror served in this county over a year ago.”); Negro Juror 
Serves in Fayette Murder Trial, LEAF-CHRON., Oct. 30, 1951, at 13 (“Ben
Murphey [is] . . . the first Negro to serve as a juror in a major case here since
reconstruction days.”); 1st Negro Jurors Serve in Marion: One on Grand Jury
Another on Trial Panel at Court, CHATTANOOGA DAILY TIMES, June 4, 1952, at
13; First Negro Juror for Tenn. County, MORRISTOWN GAZETTE MAIL, July 7,
1955, at 1; Oscar Bailey is Acquitted, SULLIVAN CNTY. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1958, at
1 (“According to courthouse observers, C.R. Green became the first Negro to
serve on a Sullivan County jury . . . .”); More Jurors Needed in Brownsville Trial,
KINGSPORT TIMES, Oct. 13, 1959, at 1 (“Two of those called—and excused— 
were Negroes, the first ever summoned for jury duty in predominantly Negro
Haywood County.”); Memphis Names Negro to Jury, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 22, 1963,
at 17.
56. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
57. Id. at 205 (“[W]hile Negro males over 21 constitute 26% of all males in
the county in this age group, only 10 to 15% of the grand and petit jury panels
drawn from the jury box since 1953 have been Negroes . . . . In this period of time,
Negroes served on 80% of the grand juries selected, the number ranging from one
to three. There were four or five Negroes on the grand jury panel of about 33 in
this case, out of which two served on the grand jury which indicted petitioner.”).
58. Id. at 223–24.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 208.
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66 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
proportional jury, or one reflective of the defendant’s community, was an
emerging idea that had only begun to take root by the time of the Court’s
decision in Swain. Instead of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, the right to a fair cross section originated from the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury.
II. FIRST WAVE OF LEGAL AND STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Case law recognizing a defendant’s right to a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community began to develop in the 1940s and 1950s.61 
Unlike Swain v. Alabama, which considered the prosecution’s conduct in
striking jurors, the fair cross-section right focused on conduct further
upstream—the system that local court officials used to summon people for
jury service. Just as with earlier jury-selection jurisprudence, the right to a
fair cross section was born out of the concern that a system excluding
African Americans from jury service based on race “contravene[d] the
very idea of a jury—‘a body truly representative of the community.’”62 In
response to the growing number of challenges to jury composition, 
Congress enacted the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA).63 
The legislation also addressed the lack of uniformity among federal
judicial districts, many of which still depended on the selection and 
eligibility requirements of the state where the federal court sat.64 In theory,
the legal and statutory solutions upholding the fair cross-section right
should have resulted in more representative juror pools. Instead, the 
process by which defendants could challenge the lack of representation on
61. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954).
62. Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (quoting Smith, 311 
U.S. at 130).
63. Edward Ranzal, Federal Jurors: Plan Under Way to Qualify Millions, 
AUSTIN AM., May 16, 1968, at 5 (“Under the plan, which will broaden the base 
for selecting jurors . . . jurors will qualify on the basis of an ‘objective’
questionnaire and will no longer be hand chosen by a court clerk or jury
commission, which can now, for instance, reject a prospective juror merely on his
appearance.”).
64. Id. (“The act will eliminate the so-called ‘key-man’ system, which is still
in effect in about 30 states. Under this system, the person in charge of jury
selection asks friends to suggest persons to serve as jurors—usually their social
peers.”).
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672020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
a jury became riddled with ambiguity, and the standard proved difficult to
meet.65 
A. The Constitutional Right to a Fair Cross Section
Although not explicitly stated in the Sixth Amendment, the fair cross-
section right derives from a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.66 In
order for the jury to fulfill its foundational role of protecting against
arbitrary power, the process of jury summoning must comport with
democratic principles.67 Although the fair cross-section right stems from
the Sixth Amendment, the prohibition on racial discrimination in jury
selection arises from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, the fair cross-section right and the right to a jury chosen
without racial discrimination differ in substantial ways. Significantly, a 
defendant challenging racial discrimination in jury selection must show
intentional discrimination, whereas a fair cross-section challenge requires
only a prima facie showing that the system summoning jurors results in
underrepresentation of a distinct group.68 
The Court’s fair cross-section jurisprudence culminated in 1979 with
Duren v. Missouri, which established the standard by which defendants
can mount a challenge.69 To prevail on a Sixth Amendment fair cross-
section claim, a defendant must show that (1) “‘the group alleged to be
excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community;’” (2) “‘the
representation of this group in venires . . . is not fair and reasonable in
65. See Sanjay K. Chablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’
Requirement, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 931, 948 (2011) (“[D]efendants have had
little success in federal courts raising Sixth Amendment claims that the juries in
their cases were selected from venires that did not reflect a ‘fair cross-section’ of 
the community. The same has been true for claims raised in state courts across the 
country. The limited efficacy of the ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence can be
traced to its entanglement with the equal protection principles . . . .”) (footnotes
omitted).
66. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (citing Smith, 311 U.S. at 130) (“The American
tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil
proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-
section of the community.”).
67. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528–29 (1975).
68. See generally Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts
Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing it with Equal 
Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141 (2012) (explaining that state and federal courts
often incorrectly apply the equal protection guarantee when assessing fair cross-
section claims).
69. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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68 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
relation to the number of such persons in the community;’” and (3) “‘this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process.’”70 Although seemingly straightforward, the
requirements in practice proved ambiguous and burdensome. 
1. Distinctive Group
Given the history of exclusion, whereby courts categorically excluded
African Americans and women from jury service, the fair cross-section
jurisprudence uniformly recognizes race and gender as distinct groups.71 
However, the Court has not been as clear about other categories. A pre-
Duren case, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., recognized wage earners as a
distinct group,72 but federal courts have been hesitant to extend protection 
to other groups.73 Although the Court has yet to define “distinctive group,”
it requires defendants mounting a fair cross-section challenge to link
distinctiveness “to the purposes of the fair cross section requirement.”74 
Said another way, the exclusion of the group in question must threaten the
democratic principles of an impartial jury. Under this rationale, some state
courts have gone beyond federal courts in finding that the exclusion of
lesbians and gay men,75 young people,76 and public housing residents77 
violated defendants’ fair cross-section right. 
2. Relative Underrepresentation 
To prove the second prong of the Duren test—underrepresentation— 
a defendant must measure the disparity of the distinctive group within the
jury pool against the presence of the distinctive group within the
community. There are two factors within the second prong that lack
70. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. 
357); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (acknowledging the Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community).
71. Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (women); Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 320 (African
Americans).
72. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
73. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (refusing to recognize
a shared viewpoint as distinct for fair cross-section); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d
986, 1010 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to recognize age as a factor qualifying as a 
distinct for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement).
74. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
75. People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347–48 (Ct. App. 2000).
76. State v. Cannon, 267 So. 3d 585 (La. 2019).
77. State v. Cage, 337 So. 1123 (La. 1976).
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692020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
clarity: the preferred method of measuring the disparity78 and the
appropriate comparator in the community.79 Regarding the first factor,
lower courts have used four measurements to determine disparity: absolute
disparity, comparative disparity, standard deviation analysis, and
probability analysis.80 The U.S. Supreme Court has not endorsed any
single test.81 This Article leaves the discussion of the benefits and
drawbacks of each method to others.82 Instead, this Article focuses on the
second of these two factors, determining the appropriate comparator in the
community.
Determining which group to measure in the community for statistical
comparison with the number in the jury pool can dictate the viability of a
fair cross-section claim. Some federal courts have clarified that the jury
summons process does not guarantee a jury “drawn from a cross-section
of the total population without the imposition of any qualifications.”83 This
rationale implies that a defendant mounting such a challenge cannot
simply rely on total population numbers of the distinct group in question.
Yet another federal court explained: a “‘truly representative cross-section’
78. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010) (“The courts
below . . . noted three methods employed . . . in lower federal court
decisions . . . . Each test is imperfect.”).
79. See United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 657 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the 
government’s argument to consider smaller subset of qualified voters in
community, instead “conclud[ing] that the appropriate measure in this case is the
eighteen and older subset of the population, regardless of other qualifications for
jury service”).
80. See Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the
Composition of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L. J. 1913, 1917–18 (1994) (referring 
to the four measures as absolute disparity, absolute impact, comparative disparity,
and statistical significance).
81. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329–30 (“Even in the absence of AEDPA's
constraint . . . we would have no cause to take sides today on the method or
methods by which underrepresentation is appropriately measured.”).
82. See, e.g., Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational
Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community,” 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 206–08 (1995) (discussing pitfalls and benefits of the
absolute disparity test and statistical deviations); Nina W. Chernoff & Joseph B.
Kadane, The 16 Things Every Defense Attorney Should Know About Fair Cross
Section Challenges, 37 CHAMPION 14, 18 (2013) (describing multiple ways courts
measure disparity).
83. United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975–76 (5th Cir. 1971)
(quoting United States v. McVean, 436 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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70 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
requirement encompasses only individuals qualified to serve as jurors.”84 
Depending on the measure in the community, a challenger may undercount
the very same population they are arguing is underrepresented in the jury
pool. Defendants who measure the jury pool against those in the
community who are eligible to vote, where jury service is tied to voter
eligibility, exclude anyone ineligible to vote due to a felony conviction,
which has a disproportionate impact on African Americans.85 Thus, using 
the number of eligible voters in the community tends to undercount the
number of Black people in the community.86 However, the Ninth Circuit
allows for a more expansive comparison—the group in the whole
community, without qualification—to make the threshold prima facie
showing.87 The Northern District of Alabama came to a similar
conclusion.88 
84. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d at 976; see also United States v. Torres-
Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “to determine whether
Hispanics are underrepresented to an unconstitutional degree in venires, a district 
court must rely on that evidence which most accurately reflects the judicial 
district's actual percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics” and “may not take into
account Hispanics who are ineligible for jury service”); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 
F.3d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Absolute disparity . . . is defined as the
difference between the percentage of a certain population group eligible for jury
duty and the percentage of that group who actually appear in the venire.”).
85. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST
VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3 (2016)
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-
Voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR9Q-ANA5].
86. See United States v. Jefferson, No. 08–140, 2011 WL 161937, at *2 (E.D.
La. Jan. 14, 2011) (explaining that percentage of registered voters is insufficient
basis for comparison because “not all registered voters are also qualified to serve
as jurors”).
87. United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
weight of Supreme Court and circuit authority teaches that, for purposes of the
prima facie case, the proportion of the distinctive group in the jury pool is to be
compared with the proportion of the group in the whole community.”).
88. United States v. Carmichael, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1307 (N.D. Ala.
2006) (“[T]he community ‘qualified for jury service’ for the purposes of a fair
cross-section challenge is not necessarily synonymous with the community
registered to vote, and courts have regularly relied on census data, especially when 
refined to exclude certain categories of ineligible persons, to establish the
benchmark community qualified for jury service.”).
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712020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
3. Systemic Exclusion 
The crux of the third prong is that the defendant must point to the
court’s summoning system as the cause for the alleged underrepresentation
over time. It is not enough for a defendant to point to the resulting lack of
representation in only the defendant’s jury pool. “[A] large discrepancy
[that] occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a
period of nearly a year” manifestly indicates that the cause of the
underrepresentation was systematic—that is, “inherent in the particular
jury-selection process utilized.”89 Per statutory guidance, most officials 
rely on voter registration lists as the source for jury pools.90 In those
instances, reviewing courts routinely decline to find that the system is
responsible for any underrepresentation.91 However, some appellate courts
have indicated a willingness to question officials’ reliance on voter
registration lists if defendants can prove that such reliance regularly results
in underrepresentation of a distinct group.92 This willingness is 
particularly prevalent in jurisdictions where voter registration is the
exclusive source for jury pools. Notably, the JSSA allows officials to
supplement with “some other source or sources of names in addition to
voter lists where necessary” to protect the fair cross-section right and to 
prevent discrimination in jury summons.93 
After the defendant makes the requisite prima facie showing of a fair
cross-section violation under Duren, the burden then shifts to the
government. The government “must show that those aspects of the jury
89. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2018).
91. See, e.g., Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.
2019) (declining to find systemic exclusion where jurisdiction relied on facially
neutral jury source list from voter registration and department of transportation
driving records); see also David M. Coriell, An (Un)fair Cross Section: How the
Application of Duren Undermines the Jury, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 479 (2015)
(courts treat voter registration lists as “presumptively valid” sources for jury
summons).
92. See United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f
the use of voter registration lists over time did have the effect of sizably
underrepresenting a particular class or group on the jury venire, then under some
circumstances, this could constitute a violation of . . . the Sixth Amendment.”);
Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[I]f the use of
voter registration lists as the origin for jury venires were to result in a sizeable
underrepresentation of a particular class or group on the jury venires, then this
could constitute a violation of a defendant’s ‘fair cross-section’ rights under the
Sixth Amendment.”).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
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72 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
selection process that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a
distinctive group manifestly advance an overriding, significant
government interest.”94 
B. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
Courts have interpreted the JSSA to coexist with defendants’
constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community.95 The Act essentially codified defendants’ constitutional
right.96 State legislatures quickly followed suit, passing similar legislation
regulating jury service in state trial courts.97 
94. United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal.
2013) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA are coextensive and
guarantee defendant’s right to grand and petit juries drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community); United States v. Shine, 571 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D. Vt.
2008) (using same three-prong test to determine violation of the fair cross-section
right under the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA); United States v. Orange, 364 F.
Supp. 2d 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (evaluating defendant’s JSSA claim using same
standards as the constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment), aff’d, 447 F.3d 
792 (10th Cir. 2006).
96. In relevant part, the statute declares that “all litigants in Federal
courts . . . shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein
the court convenes.” 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (“Declaration of Policy”).
97. See, e.g., State v. Ayer, 834 A.2d 277, 295 (N.H. 2003) (“The legislative 
policy underlying the [jury selection] statute is that all persons selected for jury
service should be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of
the area served by the court.”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 2020) (New
York state’s fair cross section requirement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1201-
A (West 2020) (“It is the policy of the state that all persons chosen for jury service
be selected at random from the broadest feasible cross section of the population
of the area served by the court . . . .”).
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732020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
III. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IN THE MODERN AGE
Jury service has long been tied to voter eligibility.98 Historically, the
requirements for jury and voter eligibility were similar.99 The JSSA further
cemented the connection between voting and jury service when it required
officials to source jury lists from the lists of registered voters.100 However,
the risk of juror underrepresentation increases where officials rely solely
on voter registration as a source given the high number of individuals
whose criminal convictions disenfranchised them. Forty-eight states
restrict the voting rights of individuals with felony convictions.101 Recent
studies estimate that over six million Americans are ineligible to vote due
to felony convictions.102 Rates of disenfranchisement fall heaviest on the 
very populations of people who are routinely underrepresented on juries— 
African Americans and Latinxs—because rates of contact with the
criminal legal system vary according to race.103 
Losing the right to vote, and subsequently the right to serve on a jury
due to a criminal conviction, is not a recent phenomenon. The first
colonists imported disenfranchisement from Europe when they settled in
North America.104 A century later, the Fourteenth Amendment, extending 
98. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding statute
directing officials to use voter registration lists in choosing qualified jurors);
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 285 (1950) (holding jurors must be qualified to
vote); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389–90 (1880) (jurors selected from
among those qualified to vote).
99. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]ll male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and sixty, who
are entitled to vote and hold office under the Constitution and laws of the State,
are liable, with certain exceptions not material to be here mentioned, to serve as 
jurors.”).
100. See U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
101. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of 
Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 595–99 (2013) (detailing the
statutes and policies in forty-eight states curtailing the right to vote based on
criminal convictions and noting Colorado and Maine as the only two states 
without policies excluding jurors based on criminal convictions).
102. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 85.
103. See J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for
Mitigating Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 42, 
43 (2009) (“African Americans and Latinos face significantly greater likelihood
of being arrested, convicted, and incarcerated than whites.”).
104. Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1045, 1061 
(2002) (“English colonists in North America transplanted much of the mother
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74 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the equal protection of the laws to African Americans, carved out a 
criminal exception enabling officials to use disenfranchisement in a
racially discriminatory way.105 Thus, states could continue to exclude
Black people from exercising basic rights of citizenship. For instance,
post-Reconstruction Kansas required that “[e]very juror must be a man of
good moral character. If ever convicted of a felony he is ineligible.”106 
Officials used disenfranchisement stemming from contact with the
criminal legal system to perpetuate African American exclusion from
juries. Many jury eligibility statutes contained only the phrase “good moral
character,” neglecting to explicitly mention a criminal conviction, so as to 
maintain all-white or virtually all-white juries. In Texas, a defendant
challenged a county’s jury summoning process that routinely empaneled
all-white grand and petit juries.107 He argued:
that there was in the county as many colored citizens of sound
judgment, approved integrity, fair character, and fully qualified
for jury duty, as white, and stated as grounds for the motion that
“the county commissioners, in selecting the lists of names for jury
duty for and during the present year, discriminated against all
colored men of African descent . . . .”108 
Given the disproportionately high rate of felony convictions among
African Americans109 and the policies that disenfranchise those with
convictions, Black people continue to be regularly underrepresented in
jury pools.110 Court officials still utilize many of the same race-neutral
country’s common law regarding the civil disabilities of convicts, and 
supplemented it with statutes regarding suffrage.”).
105. See Jennifer Rae Taylor, Constitutionally Unprotected: Prison
Slavery, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Criminal Exception to
Citizenship Rights, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 365, 369 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2).
106. Tells of Growth: Jury Canvass Reveals Some Interesting Facts, KANSAS
CITY J., July 4, 1887.
107. Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903).
108. Id. at 520.
109. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 97–114 (2012) (describing racial disparities in
criminal charging and convictions due to racially discriminatory policies).
110. See generally Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A
Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE 14–16 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M8C-UYU2] (detailing continuing legacy of illegal racial
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752020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
policies and practices that officials used to exclude Black jurors in the 19th
and early 20th centuries with the same result.111 For African Americans,
the rate of disenfranchisement from a criminal conviction is four times
greater than that of non-African Americans, with “[o]ne in 13 African
Americans of voting age . . . disenfranchised.”112 Although some
jurisdictions allow for vote restoration for individuals with felony
convictions, the process is often expensive and arduous.113 Moreover, even 
if individuals with criminal convictions make it into a jury pool,
prosecuting attorneys often remove them—either via a peremptory strike
or for cause—due to their contact with the criminal legal system.114 There
is an accepted assumption that contact with the criminal legal system
results in juror bias for the defendant. Such an assumption exacerbates jury
underrepresentation.
IV. REMEDIES
The democratic principles supporting the very existence of jury trials
beg for innovative remedies to help facilitate more racially representative
juries. At a minimum, trial courts must supplement jury source lists, courts
must broaden their interpretation of the fair cross-section standard, and
states should both ease the path to re-enfranchisement and eliminate felony
conviction disenfranchisement. Anything short of these remedies fails to
address the longstanding and persistent problem of juries lacking
meaningful racial diversity. After studying racial discrimination in jury 
selection and racial underrepresentation in juries, the Equal Justice
Initiative found that “often, the only opportunity for racial minorities to
discrimination in jury selection and underrepresentation of Black people on
criminal juries).
111. See Rebecca Santana, Mississippi Felons Push Court to Restore Voting
Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news
/us/articles/2019-12-03/mississippi-case-pushes-to-restore-felons-voting-rights
[https://perma.cc/U7NT-NRML] (“The plaintiffs . . . argue that the restoration
process violates the constitution’s Equal Protection Clause because when it was 
adopted in 1890 it was intended to keep African Americans from voting and still
disproportionately affects black people.”).
112. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 85, at 3.
113. Id. at 13 (“[I]t is clear that the vast majority of such individuals
in . . . states [that allow citizens to restore their voting rights] remain
disenfranchised. Indeed, some states have significantly curtailed restoration
efforts since 2010, including Iowa and Florida.”).
114. Roberts, supra note 101, at 599–602 (describing peremptory challenges
and challenges for cause as two ways Black prospective jurors are removed on the
basis of criminal convictions).
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76 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
influence decision-making in America’s criminal justice system is to serve
on a jury.”115 Thus, the “[e]xclusion of qualified citizens of color from jury
service amounts, then, to the near-complete absence of minority
perspective, influence, and power in the criminal justice system.”116 
Further, a multi-pronged approach is necessary to right the past wrongs
that explicitly targeted African Americans for exclusion from juries, the
remnants of which persist today.
A. Jury Source Lists
To ensure representation on juries, jurisdictions must supplement their
jury summons list with other sources, such as the department of motor
vehicles, unemployment benefits, utility or public-benefits records, and
tax rolls. Federal and state statutes allow for such supplementation. 
Some localities, including New York, have adopted these measures;
their success is still under review.117 In 2010, then New York Governor
David Paterson signed into law the Jury Pool Fair Representation Act.118 
The law allowed for the collection of annual demographic data on jurors
to enable the government to track the problem and assess remedial
tactics.119 Most importantly, the law expanded the source lists of
prospective jurors to include payers of income and property taxes; students 
receiving financial aid; senior citizens subject to rent increase exemptions;
recipients of workers compensation; individuals receiving family and
individual assistance; public housing residents; and people subscribing to
certain utility services, such as gas, electric, telephone, and cable.120 
However, recommended changes to the source lists must include
follow through. Unlike New York’s efforts, Tennessee merely
recommended action but failed to implement the recommendations. In
115. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, 
supra note 110, at 14.
116. Id. at 43.
117. See Ariel Atlas, Comment, Don’t Forget About the Jury: Advice for Civil
Litigators and Criminal Prosecutors on Differences in State and Federal Courts
in New York, 2015 CORNELL L. LIBR. PRIZE FOR EXEMPLARY STUDENT RES.
PAPER, 1, 19, available at https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp/10 [https://
perma.cc/64NV-DAMG] (noting that three rounds of juror demographic data had
been collected and analyzed, enabling litigants to use the information in potential
challenges to jury pool representation).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The Jury Pool Fair Representation Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 506(a)
(McKinney 2019).
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772020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
2000, the Tennessee Supreme Court appointed the Racial and Ethnic
Fairness Commission, which examined enhancing fairness in Tennessee’s
legal system and issued a report of its findings.121 The report looked
specifically at underrepresentation in juries and recommended that the
state supplement the standard list sources—driver’s licenses, property tax
rolls, and voting lists—to include individuals from “school enrollment,
public housing residents, and utility customers” in an effort to “adequately
represent minority demographics.”122 These recommendations have yet to
go into effect. 
B. Focusing on Prong Three of Duren
As argued above, the Duren standard is riddled with ambiguity and is
thus ripe for judicial reassessment. In dicta, several federal court opinions
contemplate a challenge to the singular source of jury pools—the voter
registration lists.123 For instance, the Third Circuit in United States v.
Weaver mused that “if the use of voter registration lists over time did have
the effect of sizeably underrepresenting a particular class or group on the
jury venire, then under some circumstances, ‘this could constitute a
violation of a defendant's “fair cross-section” rights under the [S]ixth
[A]mendment.’”124 Uniformly, these decisions decline to recognize a 
violation of the defendants’ fair cross-section right because the defendant
failed to show, under prong three, that the jury summoning system caused
underrepresentation. These decisions all invite defendants to show that the
jury summoning system that resulted in underrepresentation, namely, the 
voter registration list, is discriminatory.125 
121. TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT, IMPLEMENTING FAIRNESS: THE REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RACIAL AND
ETHNIC FAIRNESS COMMISSION AND THE GENDER FAIRNESS COMMISSION (2000),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/report_of_committee_to_imple 
ment_racia_ethnic__gender_fairness.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE2W-2RL2]. 
122. Id. at 21–22.
123. See United States v. Afflerbach, 754 F.2d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 1985)
(“Appellants can prevail only if they show that the district's reliance on
registration lists systematically excluded a distinct, cognizable class of persons
from jury service.”).
124. See United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2001).
125. See, e.g., Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (“[I]f the use of
voter registration lists as the origin for jury venires were to result in a sizeable
underrepresentation of a particular class or group on the jury venires, then this
could constitute a violation of a defendant’s ‘fair cross-section’ rights under the
Sixth Amendment.”).
348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd  82 12/2/20  7:03 AM





   
 
   
   
 
 
      
   








   
   
 
   
 
    
    
 








               
           
        
   
    
        
      
78 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Given the recent wave of voting rights lawsuits challenging voter
registration procedures,126 discriminatory voter purging procedures,127 and
the discriminatory impact of disenfranchisement on African Americans
and Latinxs,128 the climate is ideal to challenge voter registration policies
within the context of a fair cross-section right. Instead of reinventing the
wheel, criminal defendants can borrow data and legal analysis from voting
rights litigation. Most voting rights litigation occurs in federal court and
contains detailed analyses of state voting systems at a local level spanning
multiple election cycles. This is exactly the information that would be
most useful to state and federal criminal defendants who must show that
the jury summons process, over time, has produced an underrepresentation
of a distinct group.
C. Clear Path to Re-Enfranchisement: Eliminate Felony Conviction 
Disenfranchisement
Although each of the abovementioned remedies is necessary to
increase representation in juries, dismantling voter disenfranchisement
would have the most significant and immediate impact on increasing the
number of African Americans summoned for jury service. Every state and
federal jurisdiction relies on voter registration, either primarily or in part,
to summon juries. With over 7% of voting age African Americans
disenfranchised, enabling people with felony convictions to vote and thus
qualify for jury service would increase the number of Black potential
jurors. In some states, such as Florida, Virginia, and Tennessee, over 20%
of Black people of voting age are disenfranchised; in Kentucky, over
25%.129 States and the federal government can cease disenfranchising
individuals with felony convictions. Maine and Vermont remain the only
two states that allow incarcerated people to vote.130 Beginning in 1997, 
more than 20 states, including New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Virginia,
expanded voter eligibility for individuals with felony convictions.131 In
126. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Project, Work & Resources, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-
vote/voting-reform/voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/H9VF-3ET4] (listing
pending voting rights cases).
127. See, e.g., Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. LaRose, 761 Fed. Appx. 506 (6th
Cir. 2019) (lawsuit challenging Ohio’s method of purging its voter rolls).
128. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 85, at 3, 10.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 4.
131. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER:
ELIMINATING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 25 (2015),
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792020] AN UNBROKEN THREAD
2007, Maryland ended its lifetime voting ban for people who had been
subject to it post-sentence. More recently, in 2016, the state ended the
practice of banning voting for people on probation and parole.132 
CONCLUSION
The jury is a uniquely American feature of the criminal legal system.
However, in practice it exists as an aspirational concept given the lack of
racially representative juries and the relatively low percentage of cases
involving jury trials. To be clear, the low rate of jury trials does not excuse
the lack of racial diversity in trials, particularly because virtually all capital
prosecutions involve juries. Beyond changing the standard of review and
legislation regulating eligibility, actors in the courtroom during jury
selection, specifically judges and prosecutors, can provide additional
remedies. Instead of removing jurors with certain criminal convictions,
such as for drugs, gun possession, and tax evasion, if such individuals can
remain impartial, then prosecutors can keep them on juries. Moreover,
district attorneys can utilize their discretion to decline to prosecute certain
crimes, like low-level drug offenses, thus decreasing the number of people
with convictions. Judges can also prohibit counsel from inquiring about
arrest records in voir dire and from investigating prospective jurors’
records, both of which prosecutors do to remove jurors, whether with a 
peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. A defendant’s right to an
impartial jury and a juror’s right to serve are sacred rights that this country
neglected to uphold for millions of African Americans. There are concrete
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